by setting the hardware value ranges to be slightly greater than their expected range. The results of this analysis showed no difference in the number and type of constraints, as compared to those found in the main analysis. This showed that the system is tolerant to out-of-range hardware values (providing the constraints are respected).
The Exception Analyser has been implemented on a 266 MHz Pentium 2 computer, and the results for the complete analysis of the In Flight Monitor took 588 secs to perform the initial analysis. This was reduced to 350 secs when the hardware inputs were constrained to lie within their expected ranges. Around a couple of days was then needed to categorise and investigate the constraints. However, even allowing for these investigations the Exception Analysis is a cost effective approach to finding potential run time exceptions.
Conclusion
Through the use of ANDF and abstract interpretation it has been possible to formulate a model which can analyse constraints on programs for scalars and pointers to ensure that there are no dynamic run time exceptions or undefined behaviours. This paper has described the results of applying the tool to a military safety critical system currently under development, and highlighted how it was able to detect run time exceptions which previous analysis had not detected. The case study also shows the scalability potential of the approach and its ability to deliver meaningful results in a cost effective manner to system development teams. 
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Analysis of the In Flight Monitor
In selecting the In Flight Monitor as a case study for our analyser we had a number of objectives. In particular we wanted to be able to determine whether the analysis could return results that would provide feedback to the Hawk development team. We also wanted to show that the scalability of our approach to handling real systems was possible, and in addition that the levels of approximation inherent in the abstract interpretation approach did not degrade us from providing useful interpretations of the constraints determined by the analyser. The C code which makes up the In Flight Monitor contains around 6500 lines, of which 5000 are actual code. The functionality of the system is split between two principal modules, both of which have links to the hardware of the aircraft, as shown in figure 1. The main procedure is limited to initial initialisation of some global variables and then runs a never ending loop which waits for interrupts from the hardware. The key functionality of the system is contained within the monitor procedure, which gets executed through hardware interrupts. Within the system there are over 200 variables which relate directly to hardware interrupts and another 200 which are defined as static or global variables. Static variables remember their values from one call of a procedure to the next, and although they have a local namespace they behave as globals and are treated as such. The analysis started by analysing the monitor procedure through setting the values of its globals and hardware related variables as unknown. This was necessary since analysis of the monitor in isolation meant that nothing could be pre supposed about the values of the global or hardware variables since they could be changed by the main program or external interrupts. After the initial analysis pass the resulting constraints were examined to determine their reliance on the above assumptions and subsequent analysis was then able to investigate how restricting hardware input values to expected ranges altered the constraints: additional analysis was also able to determine the consequences of extending the range of hardware values beyond their expected values to determine the consequences of out-of-range values.
Analysis Results
The original analysis of the monitor gave 510 constraints i.e. restrictions on program variables which if not met could cause the program to fail. Over half of these constraints were directly related to the hardware input values being unknown and hence constrained to the widest possible machine value. When extra C code was added to constrain these variables to the expected ranges of the hardware values the total number of constraints was reduced to 250.
Examination of these constraints showed that 194 of the constraints were due to the setting of the global and static variables, again to the widest possible machine value. In particular 145 of these were directly due the calls of a filter procedure on the static variables. Examination of the procedure through the use of code walking was able to determine that the procedure would not cause a system overflow.
This left us with 56 constraints of which 24 of those were found to be consequential errors. An example of such a consequential error would be that if you get a divide by zero, the result of the divide could be any number and so this can lead to extra constraints being produced when that result is used in another calculation.
The remaining 32 constraints were directly applicable to run time exceptions. Of these constraints 5 showed potential divide by zero and 27 showed potential under/overflow exceptions. At this point we should note that the software which we were analysing had been developed to a high standard and had already been subjected to extensive tests, both static and dynamic. As a result a number of potential places in the code where exceptions could occur had already been found. The analysis performed by the Exception Analyser was able to detect these exceptions and in addition highlighted constraints for potential exceptions that no other analysis had previously identified. These constraints proved to be far from obvious as to what their consequences on the system would be and it was only through detailed codewalking and discussions with the code developer that a conclusion was reached as to the significance of the constraints. In some cases it could be determined that no overflows would occur in practise, whilst in other cases it became clear that overflows could occur. In the case where it was determined that an overflow could occur knowledge of the processor on which the implementation is to run was used to show that overflows would be handled in a manner which would not interfere with the safe operation of the system. However, this was not obvious at first and justification was needed in order to assert this.
The analysis of the In Fight Monitor was also carried out else return 0; } Analysis of the type of j shows that the input parameter must have a range (0; maxint)] for the procedure to be valid and a constraint is placed on the input to this effect. In the analysis of the procedure body, both arms of the conditional are evaluated separately and then the results combined. The return condition from the first arm restricts the result of the procedure to lie within (11; maxint?10)] and the else arms to (0; 0)]. These are then combined to give an overall return value for the procedure as (0; 0); (11; maxint ? 10)]. This is legitimate, and hence no further constraints are needed. However, if we now consider the following adaptation of the procedure (which could have been caused by a typographical error):
return j-10; else return 0; } The result of the procedure from the first arm would be (?7; maxint ? 10)]. However, this is outside the permitted range of values for an unsigned integer, and hence a constraint must be placed on the input to the procedure to restrict the returned value range to that of an unsigned integer. Thus a constraint will be placed on the procedure input to lie within the range (0; 2); (10; maxint)]. Given this constarint the final value of the procedure will be (0; maxint ? 10)] Whilst the above example shows a simple value/constraint calculation other constructs require more analysis. To evaluate a loop, for example, requires that we find a fixed point for the variables of the loop, which in turn can involve certain approximations in order to arrive at a fixed point. In particular we must find an environment for evaluating the body of a loop that will lead to the same environment being applied on any further repetition of the loop. A fixed point can always be found, for example by taking the widest possible machine value for a type. Recursive procedures are handled using similar techniques to loops.
The use of set union to combine the different integer ranges, as demonstrated above, is a special case of how different values and constraints can be combined. The entire domain of values in the program form a lattice and values/constraints are combined using the least upper bound operation of this lattice. The parts of this lattice dealing with non-numeric values, such as pointers, follow a similar approach to that used for integers whereby the upper bound for their values will also be set union. However for non-numeric values the algorithm for performing the set union efficiently is usually more elaborate than for integers.
Analysis of pointer aliasing has been easily accommodated within our model since procedures are analysed using in-lining of procedure calls.
An implementation of the approach, called the Exception Analyser, has been programmed in a combination of C and Python and is around 30K lines of code (excluding the ANDF producers). The implementation has programmed analysis for all the 58 ANDF algebraic sorts that include the 116 components that form the expression sort (for describing program expressions), and 185 components from the other algebraic sorts. The Exception Analyser has been tested on a large number of, relatively small, C programs to investigate its analysis. However, to be useful for military safety critical systems the use of the Analyser must be scaleable to larger programs. We therefore carried out a case study on the use of the Analyser to investigate this issue, and the results are given in the next section of this paper.
The Safety Critical Case Study
The ASTRA Hawk In Flight Monitor
The Empire Test Pilot School ASTRA Hawk aircraft is fitted with a Variable Stability System (VSS) which allows the test pilot trainee to control the aircraft via the VSS. This enables the flying characteristics of the Hawk to be given variable degrees of stability and control responses depending on the particular training scenario. The trainer in the rear seat is able to monitor the performance and at any time trip the VSS system and take control on a full set of conventional mechanical controls.
The flight envelope in which the VSS can be engaged and remain engaged is also monitored by the In Flight Monitor. This system monitors a large number of flight and aircraft system parameters and calculates various current and predicted forces on the aircraft. If any of the measured or calculated values fall outside the agreed flight envelope the In Flight Monitor immediately disengages the VSS.
The code for the In Flight Monitor which we have analysed has been coded in C. The detailed system specification, design and development of the In Flight Monitor system was undertaken by colleagues at the Systems and Software Engineering Centre based at DERA Malvern. The software is being significantly "bench-tested" as much as possible before final integration and testing is carried out on the aircraft. As part of this bench-testing our analysis tool has been employed to examine the behaviour of the system to software exceptions. The aircraft integration and final testing, which is still some way off, will be undertaken by the DERA certification authority which is situated at Boscombe Down, with support from other areas of DERA. Evidence collected during the bench-testing will go towards supplying data for the safety case, which needs to be made before any certification of air unset variables divide by zero indexing beyond array bounds dereferencing of pointers that contain no data accessing a variable that has gone out of scope checking types of values on assignment Whilst these errors can often be picked up using runtime checks, our aim is to predict such errors statically, and hence prove that such errors are not possible for any program execution. Even for languages such as Ada, which allows exception handling in the language, unanticipated exceptions can occur and it is vital that independent checks can be carried out to locate potential unanticipated exceptions. In safety critical systems any exceptions which are anticipated should be handled locally by specially written routines rather than allowing for system exceptions, since even raising an exception can be catastrophic in such systems.
Our analysis looks for a minimal set of constraints on the program variables, for which the program is well-behaved. This set must be proved to hold for any safety critical system: this will often be done by code walking to determine what the condition really means, or by looking at the system inputs to determine their valid ranges. Indeed it may be necessary to carry out further analysis by asserting some subset of the conditions and repeating the analysis.
Language Independent Analysis
An objective of the development of our approach was to provide a tool, which aids the validation of safety critical systems. Many such programs are written in Ada, but pressure is continuing to use other languages like C and C++ in such situations, mainly for reasons of the availability of well-tried and tested compilers and compatibility with existing systems. However, the particular language used is largely irrelevant to the process of validation. One can write a wrong program in any language and it is only the pattern of probable errors which actually changes. Our work therefore adopted an approach that would develop an analysis technique that could be used on the major languages used for safety critical system development. In order to do this the Architecture Neutral Distribution Format (ANDF) [OSF91] was chosen as our basis for analysis. An advantage of using this format is that the ANDF specification is in the public domain [Andf99], and hence does not tie our approach to a proprietary notation.
The ANDF concept was originally defined by the Open Software Foundation as a technique for porting programs from one machine architecture to another. Compilers usually contain distinct language processing and code generation elements, and the ANDF concept formalises this distinction. The language processing element is called a producer and this generates ANDF while the code generation element is called an installer and this translates the ANDF into machine specific object code. ANDF is not an abstract machine in the sense of modelling hardware elements such as registers or stacks, but instead retains the basic elements of programming languages such as declarations and expressions delivering values. Higher level objects are broken down into basic pointer operations. ANDF is a many sorted algebra that is neutral with respect to both source language and target hardware. This means that it provides an ideal vehicle from which to base our analysis, so that the results of our work can be applicable to the range of languages for which translators currently exist. In the case of safety critical systems this means that C, C++ and Ada can all be analysed through the same tool. The ANDF producers for C and C++ are available free within the public domain and can be found at the ANDF web site [Andf99], whilst a commercial Ada producer can be obtained from DDC-I [DDC99]. Since ANDF provides constructs for all its targeted languages semantics, our analysis is able to analyse any program written in C, C++ and Ada, and hence does not require the use of a sub-set of a language, such a MISRA-C [MIS98] or SPARK-Ada [Bar97].
The Exception Analyser Approach
Our use of abstract interpretation has been to abstract values onto sets of ranges of values ([Cur98] ). However, it should be noted that for any abstraction the properties determined are nearly always approximations. For example, if data analysis delivered the property "under some executions of the program the variable x is uninitialised", then this property is approximate since it refers to some executions of the program only, and indeed these may be unfeasible paths.
Within our approach, each program construct has an operation that evaluates the construct in our abstract semantics, where the evaluation function has the following signature static analysis and abstract interpretation. Section 3 will then outline the aims and approach that we have adopted in the development of our Exception Analyser tool. The results of applying our tool to the Hawk In Flight Monitor are discussed in section 4.
Assessment Through Analysis
Industrial Static Analysis
Static analysis is widely used within industry for the analysis of safety critical code (see [WCC95] In general, the process of analysis within these approaches can be categorised into four distinct stages: Translation of code into an intermediate language; Flow analysis; Semantic analysis; Compliance analysis. The first stage, translation into an intermediate language, requires the source code to be translated into a format which the analyser can manipulate. The second stage, flow analysis, consists of the following three forms of analysis: control flow, data flow and information flow. Whilst control and data flow can be carried out on source code directly, the information flow usually requires annotations to be added to the source code. These annotations define a specification of the relationship between the inputs to a procedure and the output. The analysis can then detect discrepancies between program code and interface specifications, as well as detecting redundant statements. Semantic analysis then reduces the intermediate representation of a program into a set of algebraic expressions which relate the final values of the output variables of a proecdure to the initial values of the input variables. The last stage, compliance analysis, is the automatic comparison of a formal specification of the program with the results of the semantic analysis.
The MALPAS and SPADE tools perform similar forms of flow, semantic and compliance analysis, although the SPARK examiner is specific to the SPARK ADA subset. However, these approaches only give results for what are traditionally thought of as static properties. In order to consider how such analysis can be moved forward it is necessary to consider how properties that are essentially dynamic can be modelled in a static manner. One such approach that has provided a number of researchers with an opening into this form of analysis is abstract interpretation. In section 3 of this paper we will outline how we have used abstract interpretation as a basis for our approach, but before that we consider the general abstract interpretation concept.
Abstract Interpretation for Systems Analysis
Abstract Interpretation has been around for many years, but it was only in 1977 when Cousot and Cousot produced their seminal paper [CC77] which generalised several ad hoc data flow analyses techniques that the approach was put on a firm foundation.
We will follow Jones and Nielsons [JN95] definition of abstract interpretation as a semantics-based version of nonstandard execution, where non-standard execution is: perform commands, or evaluate expressions using stores or values drawn from abstract store/value domains instead of the actual stores or values used in executable computations of a system. deduce information about the programs computation on actual input data from the resulting abstract descriptions of stores or values.
The principal idea in the Cousot and Cousot approach is to consider the abstraction of program values into sets of values and to develop operations on these sets of values. We have taken this approach and extended it to consider how sets of ranges of values can be used as an abstraction for use in exception analysis. Our approach is similar to what is normally considered as "interval analysis" (see Moore [Moo66] ) in that we are looking to bound the range of a variable through the discrete values that variables can take, which for convenience we represent as unions of ranges. The ability for such approaches to be scaleable to real industrial applications has been demonstrated in theory by Bourdoncle [Bou93] , however one of our objectives for the case study of a real safety critical system was to demonstrate this scalability in practise.
The Exception Analyser Tool
Aims of the Exception Analyser
The principal aim of the exception analyser is to determine the states of a program in which the rules of the coding language are not violated, that is those in which there is no exceptional or undefined behaviour. It was also an aim of our approach not to require any code annotations. This is an important point from the viewpoint of system acceptance and safety case analysis where the developers of the software may not be available to determine what, if any, annotations should be added. 
Safety Critical System Assessment
Software analysis is essential for any formal assessment of software, whether on the grounds of quality, system acceptance or the demonstration of levels of integrity required for safety critical systems. Understanding the source code of a program is difficult enough for the people who wrote it, but it is considerably harder for anyone making an independent assessment. Software analysis tools can be used to demonstrate properties such as control flow complexity or the dependency relations between variables and this can provide valuable insight and checks on obscure conditions, which might otherwise go unnoticed. As a result there are requirements for software analysis in the MOD standard for . Software analysis is very widely used in industry, not only for safety critical systems, but also as an aid to the production of high quality software.
There are also a wide range of hazard analysis approach which are applied to software development, for eaxmple Fault Tree Analysis, Event Tree Analysis, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, and HAZOP to name but a few. However, these approaches are aimed at determining the underlying risks of a system and not at analysis of the software produced (see Leveson [Lev95] for an outline of the above approaches).
Software analysis can be either static or dynamic, see for example Osterweil [Ost81] . In static analysis, the code is analysed and the assessment result produced directly from the analysis. Whereas in dynamic analysis, the compiled code is instrumented to measure the properties required, and the modified program is run to produce the assessment result. Static analysis is widely used for testing a large range of properties and is more desirable than dynamic analysis because it provides general, rather than specific properties, which are valid for all executions of a program. Whilst there are a large number of tools in the area there are also drawbacks. For example, the properties which they analyse are limited to specific languages or language subsets, and extending analysis to cover properties such as analysis of pointers and exceptions has proved difficult for most approaches.
Within the System Assurance Group at the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency at Malvern UK, we are interested in developing static analysis tools and techniques which can be used to extend the range of current industrial analyses available and which can be used to aid the system acceptance of military systems. This paper outlines one of the tools that has been developed which looks at the analysis of software exceptions through abstract interpretation of the variable values into sets of ranges of values. Within this paper we present the results of this work as applied to the military safety critical project of the Hawk's In Flight Monitor system. The format of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we outline the background to our work, namely the use of
